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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order entered on November 24, 1999, denying an 
application seeking attorney's fees filed by certain 
successful defendants in the aftermath of the entry of an 
order dismissing the complaint against them in this civil 
rights action. The Barnes Foundation (the"Barnes"), which 
brought the action, is a Pennsylvania corporation that 
operates an art gallery on North Latches Lane in Lower 
Merion Township, Pennsylvania, in the Philadelphia 
suburbs. Dr. Albert C. Barnes established the Barnes in 
1922 by Indenture and Agreement conveying the real estate 
that the Barnes currently occupies, as well as his art 
collection. The Indenture provides that the Foundation's 
purpose is "to promote the advancement of education and 
the appreciation of the fine arts." App. at 178. The Barnes 
is governed by a board of trustees that during the time 
relevant to this action consisted of Shirley A. Jackson, 
Niara Sudarkasa, Charles A. Frank III and Richar d H. 
Glanton, the board's president. Lincoln University, which 
the Barnes describes as "a predominately and historically 
African-American university," see br . at 4, located in 
Chester County, Pennsylvania, appoints all but one of the 
trustees and the Mellon Bank appoints the other . At the 
times relevant to this opinion, the trustees except for 
Frank, who is or was a Senior Vice Pr esident of Mellon, 
were African-American. 
 
The six appellants-defendants, Ina Asher, Steven Asher, 
Nancy Herman, Walter Herman, Robert Marmon and Toby 
Marmon, are residents of the neighborhood in which the 
Barnes is located. Even though the Bar nes brought this 
action against 17 neighbors as well as Lower Merion 
Township (the "Township"), the Lower Merion Board of 
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Commissioners (the "Board"), and each of the township 
commissioners (the "Commissioners") in their individual 
and official capacities, the six appellants ar e the only 
defendants who are parties to this appeal. 
 
The events giving rise to this case originate fr om the 
Barnes' operation and use of its gallery. For many years 
access to the gallery was limited, see Bar nes Found. v. 
Keely, 171 A. 267, 268 (Pa. 1934), but in 1960, pursuant 
to the entry of a consent decree between the Barnes and 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Barnes opened the 
gallery to the public two days per week, except during July 
and August of each year. Subsequently, the Barnes opened 
the gallery to the public for an additional half-day per week. 
In 1990, Glanton became president of the Bar nes' board of 
trustees and in that capacity, beginning in 1993, initiated 
a major renovation of its facilities and art gallery. By reason 
of the renovation, the Barnes was closed until November 
1995. To fund the renovations, the Bar nes sent certain 
selected works of art from its collection on a world tour 
which generated a great deal of publicity for the Barnes. 
 
Around August or September of 1995, prior to the 
Barnes' reopening, it sought permission from the Township 
to construct a parking lot on its property. This application 
prompted the neighbors and other individuals to voice 
concerns over the facility's scheduled r eopening as they 
believed that the reopening would cause parking, noise and 
pollution problems. Contemperaneously, individuals living 
in the area of the Barnes, including the appellants, formed 
The Latches Lane Neighborhood Association to oppose the 
Barnes' reopening, as well as to challenge certain of its 
other activities that they believed violated the 1922 
Indenture and Agreement as well as local zoning laws. The 
Barnes alleges that this opposition included supporting 
litigation in the Montgomery County Orphan's Court 
concerning its request to change the ter ms and conditions 
for the operation of the gallery, in particular opposing its 
attempt to expand its operations from two and one-half to 
six days per week. 
 
The complaint in this action alleges that the Bar nes' 
neighbors and township officials conspired to deprive it of 
its constitutional rights on the basis of the race of three of 
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the four Barnes trustees and that the neighbors and 
officials agreed that the Township would discriminate 
against the Barnes by requiring "strict compliance" with 
township rules and regulations and by "closely 
monitor[ing]" the Barnes, while not tr eating its institutional 
neighbors in this way. See app. at 185. According to the 
Barnes, the conspiracy's ultimate goal was to prevent its 
reopening. 
 
The Barnes set forth particularized allegations in its 
complaint. Thus, it charged that in the months preceding 
its scheduled reopening, the Township and neighbors 
engaged in several activities with the intention of preventing 
its reopening. The Barnes said that to further this goal 
during the last two months of construction at the Barnes, 
a township inspector made six unannounced visits to the 
site and that during the final inspection of the premises on 
October 30, 1995, approximately two weeks prior to the 
scheduled reopening, the deputy fire marshal announced 
prior to beginning an inspection that the facility would not 
pass. The Barnes alleges that he imposed several arbitrary 
and unreasonable requirements on it as requirements for 
obtaining a certificate of occupancy. 
 
On November 9, 1995, two days before the Bar nes' 
scheduled opening gala events, David Latshaw, the 
Township Manager, sent Glanton a letter criticizing, among 
other things, the Barnes' lack of a traffic plan for the 
reopening. Glanton responded by letter indicating his belief 
that Latshaw's letter was overly hostile and that the 
Township was treating the Barnes differently from other 
entitites because of racial animus. The Barnes asserts that 
when the parties met the day of the opening gala, the 
Township treated it in an overtly hostile manner. 
 
The complaint further alleges that on November 10 and 
11, 1995, during the opening gala events, certain persons, 
including appellants Ina Asher, Walter Herman, Robert 
Marmon, and Toby Marmon, congr egated and picketed at 
the Barnes' main gate to protest its r eopening. Moreover, it 
asserted that unspecified individuals carried placards that 
read, among other things, "From LA to P A, Money Buys 
Justice" and "Lincoln University - Go Home." In addition, 
 
                                5 
  
Robert Marmon and Toby Marmon videotaped gallery 
visitors entering and exiting the Barnes. 
 
Four days after the gala events, the Commissioners held 
a meeting to discuss the Barnes situation. At the hearing, 
several neighbors, including Robert Marmon and Steven 
Asher, spoke out against the official r eopening scheduled 
for the following day, November 16, 1995. Specifically, 
Robert Marmon stated, in relevant part: 
 
       For sixteen years we hardly knew the Bar nes 
       Foundation was across the street. They wer e good 
       neighbors. Then, something changed. We didn't 
       change. We did nothing wrong. Outsiders have taken 
       over the Barnes, people who have no attachment to the 
       neighborhood, to the life we have quietly enjoyed. We 
       have been citizens here for decades. Mr . Glanton and 
       his people have not been. We have been voters here for 
       decades. Mr. Glanton and his people have not. And 
       most importantly, we have been taxpayers her e for 
       decades and Mr. Glanton and his people have not. I 
       now finally understand what a carpetbagger is and how 
       one operates. 
 
Id. at 94. The Barnes contends that Marmon's use of the 
words "outsiders," "Mr. Glanton and his people," and 
"carpetbagger" indicates a racially hostile attitude both on 
his part and on that of his fellow neighbors. 
 
At the end of the meeting, the Commissioners adopted a 
resolution requesting that the Bar nes delay its reopening 
until it developed plans to manage the parking and crowd 
problems effectively, or, if the opening proceeded, to "take 
any and all appropriate actions necessary to maintain the 
peace, safety, and quality of life of the surr ounding 
neighborhood and its residents and assur e that the 
operation of the facility by the Barnes Foundation complies 
with the Township of Lower Merion zoning code." Id. at 100. 
The Commissioners adopted the resolution pursuant to 
their findings that the Barnes estimated that it would have 
significantly more visitors in the first year following the 
reopening than in previous years, and that the parking and 
crowd control arrangements to accommodate the visitors 
were inadequate. Moreover, the Commissioners were 
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concerned that the proposed use did not comply with the 
Township's zoning laws which apparently zoned the Latches 
Lane area for residential and educational use, but not for 
an art gallery. The Commissioners therefor e believed that 
the Barnes might violate the local zoning or dinances if the 
primary focus of its operations was the operation of the 
gallery, as opposed to conducting its educational pr ograms. 
 
Notwithstanding the objections, the Barnes r eopened, 
though it did not attract as many people as anticipated. 
The neighbors still had complaints, however, about traffic 
and parking, and the concerns about potential zoning 
violations persisted. The Township addr essed these issues 
in a letter dated November 29, 1995, from the President of 
the Township Commissioners to the neighbors informing 
them that the Commissioners had heard their concerns and 
had been moved to act in response. 
 
On December 13, 1995, the Township issued a violation 
notice against the Barnes because it was open more than 
two and one-half days per week and received mor e than 
500 visitors per week, thus violating the operating 
restrictions imposed on it since 1961. The Bar nes contends 
that the Township zoning officer admitted that he had no 
rational basis for ordering the Barnes to comply with the 
1961 attendance levels restrictions, particularly inasmuch 
as the Township had not been doing so immediately prior 
to its closure for renovations.1  
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Following the issuance of the December 13, 1995 notice 
of violation the Barnes filed a district court complaint on 
January 18, 1996, alleging that the Township, the Board, 
the Commissioners and 17 of the Barnes' r esidential 
neighbors deprived and conspired to deprive it of its rights 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States Constitution contrary to 42 U.S.C.SS 1983 
and 1985 by treating it differently from its institutional 
neighbors as a result of a racially-motivated conspiracy 
between the Township and the neighbors.2 On March 18, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The notice of violation was withdrawn, butfiled again on the same 
grounds on August 6, 1996. 
2. The complaint included an immaterial allegation that Glanton is a 
Republican. See app. at 179. In this r egard, we point out that a party to 
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1996, the Township, the Board and the Commissioners 
filed motions to dismiss the Barnes' complaint, but the 
district court denied the motions by Memorandum and 
Order dated June 3, 1996. See Barnes Found. v. Township 
of Lower Merion, 927 F. Supp. 874, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1996).3 
Between March 18, 1996, and April 1, 1996, all of the 
neighbor defendants also filed motions to dismiss the 
complaint, contending that they enjoyed First Amendment 
immunity from liability for petitioning the government. Id. 
at 875-76. The district court agreed with the neighbors and 
thus, in its June 3, 1996 Memorandum and Order , granted 
their motions to dismiss. See id. at 878. 
 
Subsequently the Township and the Commissioners filed 
a joint counterclaim asserting that by bringing this action 
the Barnes abused the judicial process. The Barnes 
responded to the counterclaim with a motion to dismiss 
which the district court denied. Thereafter , the Barnes 
unsuccessfully sought permission to amend the complaint 
further, adding new claims against the neighbor defendants 
and asserting claims on behalf of Glanton individually. 
 
Following the close of discovery, the Township, the Board 
and the Commissioners filed motions for summary 
judgment on all of the Barnes' claims, which the district 
court granted on September 26, 1997. See Bar nes Found. 
v. Township of Lower Merion, 982 F . Supp. 970, 1005 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997). The Township's and Commissioners' 
counterclaim was dismissed thereafter pursuant to a 
settlement, and a final order was enter ed on October 2, 
1998, and then amended on October 28, 1998. The Bar nes 
appealed from the district court's final or der but then 
voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Glanton also filed an 
appeal which we dismissed on March 12, 1999. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
litigation should not gratuitously set forth in its pleadings the 
political 
affiliation of its president lest the court believe that the party is 
making 
an appeal for favorable treatment on account of that affiliation. 
 
3. The Commissioners and other Township officials also filed a 
defamation action against the trustees of the Bar nes on March 3, 1996, 
in state court. 
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Upon resolution of the summary judgment motions, the 
appellants filed a motion for attorney's fees and expenses 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988 which the district court 
denied on November 24, 1999. See Barnes Found. v. 
Township of Lower Merion, No. CIV. A. 96-372, 1999 WL 
1065213 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1999). The appellants then 




A. Standard of Review 
 
We review the district court's or der denying the 
appellants' motion for attorney's fees on an abuse of 
discretion basis. See EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 
750 (3d Cir. 1997); Brown v. Bor ough of Chambersburg, 903 
F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 1990). In this case, the appellants 
challenge the district court's conclusions both as to the 
legal and factual sufficiency of the Barnes' claims. We 
exercise plenary review over sufficiency of evidence issues 
and legal issues but use the clearly erroneous standard 
when reviewing factual findings. See Quir oga v. Hasbro, 
Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1991); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1990). 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Defendants Leonard H. Ginsburg and Beth Ginsburg joined in the 
motion but are not parties to the appeal. Other defendants also 
submitted motions seeking fees but as those motions are not implicated 
on this appeal we need not discuss their disposition. 
 
5. We note that in his dissenting opinion Judge Nygaard recites that we 
have vested the trial court with "discretionary authority [with respect to 
fee applications] for good reason [as it] has the distinct advantage of 
hearing and seeing evidence and testimony first-hand and has viewed 
the parties and the cause over a longer time period." Dissent at 27. 
While we do use an abuse of discretion standar d on this appeal, we 
point out that Judge Nygaard's reasoning is not applicable in this case 
inasmuch as Judge Brody granted the motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment and thereafter, on May 26, 1998, the case was 
reassigned to Judge Buckwalter who denied appellants' application for 
fees. Furthermore, Judge Buckwalter did so on the basis of the record 
without conducting a trial-type hearing. Consequently, he did not have 
an opportunity to see the parties testify first-hand and, in reality, even 
though we are adjudicating this appeal on an abuse of discretion basis, 
we doubt that Judge Buckwalter had any advantage over us in 
considering the appellants' fee application. 
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B. Availability of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Section 1988 
 
The appellants contend that the district court err ed in 
concluding that the Barnes' claims wer e neither legally nor 
factually frivolous and that it should have awar ded them 
attorney's fees on both of those bases pursuant to section 
1988. Section 1988 provides, in relevant part: "In any 
action or proceeding to enforce a pr ovision of sections . . . 
1983 [and] 1985 . . . of this title, . . . the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 
costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b). The"prevailing party" can 
be either the plaintiff or the defendant but the standard for 
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants is more 
stringent than that for awarding fees to pr evailing plaintiffs. 
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 
421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700 (1978); L.B. Foster, 123 F.3d at 750- 
51.6 As the Supreme Court held in Christiansburg, while 
prevailing plaintiffs "should or dinarily recover an attorney's 
fee unless special circumstances would r ender such an 
award unjust," a prevailing defendant is entitled to 
attorney's fees only "upon a finding that the plaintiff 's 
action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation 
. . . ." Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 416-17, 421, 98 S.Ct. at 
698, 700. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the 
prevailing defendant establish that the plaintiff had 
subjective bad faith in bringing the action in or der to 
recover attorney's fees. Rather, the relevant standard is 
objective. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 
173, 178 (1980). Furthermore, the Supr eme Court has 
indicated that "it is important that a . . . court resist the 
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc  reasoning 
by concluding that because a plaintiff did not ultimately 
prevail his action must have been unreasonable or without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The standards for assessing claims for attorney's fees pursuant to 
section 1988 and under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
5(k), are identical. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 
n.7, 
103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 n.7 (1983); Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 
S.Ct. 173, 178 (1980). Accordingly, cases used to interpret one statute 
may be used to interpret the other. See Brown, 903 F.2d at 277 n.1; 
Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443, 447 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
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foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 
700. 
 
We have relied on several factors in determining whether 
a plaintiff 's unsuccessful civil rights claim was frivolous 
including whether the plaintiff established a prima facie 
case, the defendant offered to settle, the trial court 
dismissed the case prior to trial or the case continued until 
a trial on the merits. See L.B. Foster, 123 F.3d at 751. 
Other factors that courts have considered in determining if 
an action was frivolous include whether the question in 
issue was one of first impression requiring judicial 
resolution, the controversy is based sufficiently upon a real 
threat of injury to the plaintiff, the trial court has made a 
finding that the suit was frivolous under the Christiansburg 
guidelines, and the record supports such afinding. See 
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 894 F.2d 250, 253-54 
(7th Cir. 1995). These considerations, however, are merely 
guidelines, not strict rules; thus "[d]eter minations regarding 
frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis." Sullivan v. 
School Bd., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir . 1983). 
 
C. Legal Sufficiency of the Barnes' Claims 
 
The appellants first argue that the Bar nes knew or 
should have known that they enjoyed First Amendment 
immunity for their conduct pursuant to the Noerr - 
Pennington doctrine. The Barnes contends that an 
individual's immunity under that doctrine for alleged 
violations of civil rights was not established in this circuit 
at the time it filed suit, particularly in cases in which it was 
alleged that a racially discriminatory animus motivated a 
defendant's actions. Therefore, it ar gues that its case 
against the neighbors, including the appellants, was not 
legally frivolous. 
 
Unquestionably, given the outstanding case law at the 
time the Barnes filed suit against the neighbors, the district 
court properly dismissed its case against them by reason of 
their First Amendment immunity and, indeed, the Bar nes 
on this appeal does not challenge that disposition. But, as 
we shall explain, prior to the institution of this action 
neither the Supreme Court nor this court had held 
expressly that the Noerr-Pennington  doctrine provides an 
 
                                11 
  
immunity for First Amendment activity allegedly 
constituting a civil rights abuse, especially when a racially 
discriminatory animus allegedly motivated the activity. 
 
1. Status of the Law in the Supreme Court and this 
       Circuit 
 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originated more than 30 
years prior to the Barnes filing the complaint in this action 
when the Supreme Court held in Easter n Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 81 S.Ct. 523 (1961) ("Noerr"), and United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965) 
("Pennington"), that an individual is immune from liability 
for exercising his or her First Amendment right to petition 
the government. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669-70, 85 
S.Ct. at 1593; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38, 81 S.Ct. at 529- 
30; see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-80, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1353-54 
(1991). The Court made these rulings in an antitrust 
context where the defendants engaged in campaigns 
directed towards obtaining governmental action for the 
purpose of eliminating competition in their r espective 
industries. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660, 85 S.Ct. at 
1588; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 81 S.Ct. at 525. In those 
situations, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' 
conduct violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659, 85 S.Ct. at 1588; Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 129, 81 S.Ct. at 525. The Supreme Court disagreed 
with the plaintiffs, holding that the Sher man Act did not 
proscribe the campaign. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671, 
85 S.Ct. at 1594; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145, 81 S.Ct. at 533. 
The Court recognized that the "right of petition is one of the 
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of 
course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these 
freedoms." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138, 81 S.Ct. at 530. The 
Court held that there was immunity regar dless of the 
defendants' motivations in waging their campaigns, as it 
recognized that the right of individuals to petition the 
government "cannot properly be made to depend on their 
intent in doing so." Id. at 139, 81 S.Ct. at 530. 
 
The Supreme Court and this court have extended the 
scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine beyond the antitrust 
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context. Thus, in NAACP v. Claiborne Har dware Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982), the Court applied the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a civil conspiracy claim by 
white merchants whose businesses were boycotted by the 
NAACP. See id. at 912-14, 102 S.Ct. at 3425-26. The 
boycott was intended to force compliance with a list of 
demands for racial equality and integration that had been 
presented to white elected officials. See id. at 889-90, 102 
S.Ct. at 3413. The boycott was supported by speeches, 
meetings and picketing, although there wer e threats of 
actual violence as well. Applying the principles set forth in 
Noerr-Pennington, the Court unanimously held that the 
First Amendment protected the nonviolent aspects of the 
boycott. See id. at 907-08, 102 S.Ct. at 3422 (reaffirming 
principle that " `the practice of persons sharing common 
views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply 
embedded in the American political process' " (quoting 
Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. 
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294, 102 S.Ct. 434, 436 
(1981))). The Court reached its conclusion even though 
some members of the group may have engaged in 
unprotected conduct. 
 
We extended the principles of the Noerr -Pennington 
doctrine in Pfizer Inc. v. Giles (In r e Asbestos School 
Litigation), 46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir . 1994), and Brownsville 
Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d 
Cir. 1988), in which we held that the r espective defendants 
were immune from liability for civil conspiracy pursuant to 
the First Amendment. See Pfizer, 46 F .3d at 1289-90; 
Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 160. In Brownsville, the plaintiff, 
a nursing home, alleged that the defendants engaged in a 
civil conspiracy designed to lead to the state r evoking its 
nursing home license. See Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 156. 
Two defendants, private citizens who visited the nursing 
home, communicated their concern over what they viewed 
as appalling conditions to federal and state officials. See id. 
at 157-58. They engaged the efforts of Senator Heinz, and 
together sought to have the home decertified. See id. at 
158. The district court granted the defendants' summary 
judgment motions, and we affirmed. See id. Relying on the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine we held that the defendants were 
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immune from conspiracy liability for damages r esulting 
from inducing official action. See id.  at 160. 
 
Likewise, in Pfizer the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants, several manufacturers of asbestos-containing 
building products ("ACBPs"), conspir ed with each other and 
acted in concert to produce and sell ACBPs without 
warnings and with knowledge of the danger they presented. 
See Pfizer, 46 F.3d at 1286. One of the defendants, Pfizer, 
moved for summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and 
concert of action claims, claiming that the evidence 
supporting the plaintiffs' claims consisted entirely of the 
fact that Pfizer had manufactured an ACBP fr om 1964 until 
1972 and that in 1984, Pfizer became associated with the 
Safe Buildings Alliance ("SBA"), a lobbying or ganization 
that, among other things, represented its members' 
interests before federal, state and local government officials 
and agencies. See id. at 1287. The district court denied 
Pfizer's motion on the ground that a jury r easonably could 
conclude there was a conspiracy based on Pfizer's 
involvement with and financial support for the SBA. See id. 
Pfizer unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration and, 
following the denial of its request for certification of an 
interlocutory appeal, it petitioned us seeking a writ of 
mandamus that effectively would overtur n the district 
court's decision. See id. at 1288. 
 
We granted Pfizer's petition. See id.  at 1290. Relying on 
Claiborne Hardware, we found that the First Amendment 
right to petition government protected Pfizer's association 
with the SBA and that to the extent that the First 
Amendment did not protect the SBA's activities, Pfizer 
could not be held liable absent evidence that its actions 
with regard to the SBA were intended specifically to further 
that wrongful conduct. 
 
Therefore, at the time the Barnesfiled its complaint, we 
already had applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in varied 
contexts. Nevertheless, while in Pfizer we stated that we 
saw no reason why this principle of First Amendment 
immunity was not meant to have general applicability, we 
had not determined in an actual case involving a claim of 
an infringement of civil rights that a Noerr -Pennington 
defense was available when the Barnes filed its complaint 
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in this action. While not determinative, this circumstance 
mitigates against a finding that the Barnes' suit against the 
neighbors was legally frivolous. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 
F.2d 977, 987 (6th Cir. 1984) (r eversing award of attorney's 
fees to prevailing defendant in part because legal issue was 
not well-settled in circuit or country). 
 
2. Status of the Law in Other Circuits  
 
We recognize that by the time the Bar nes filed its 
complaint, several other courts of appeals had made the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and First Amendment immunity 
expressly applicable as defenses to causes of action arising 
under federal civil rights laws. See Eaton v. Newport Bd. of 
Educ., 975 F.2d 292, 299 (6th Cir . 1992) (holding teachers' 
union and individual immune under Noerr-Pennington for 
lobbying that led to school principal's dischar ge); Video Int'l 
Prod., Inc. v. Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 
F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding Noerr-Pennington 
precluded defendant's liability as conspirator with city in 
violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. S 1983); Stevens v. 
Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
applicability of Noerr-Pennington as defense to plaintiff 's 
civil rights action, but finding for defendants on other 
grounds); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204 
(9th Cir. 1984) (upholding award of attorney's fees to 
defendants immunized from liability by Noerr-Pennington for 
petitioning government to declare r oad spanning plaintiff 's 
land public); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 
607, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding private citizen immune 
from section 1983 liability in zoning dispute). We think that 
this point is important because, even in the absence of 
binding precedent in this court, the pr esence of well- 
established case law in other circuits when an action is 
filed could demonstrate that the action was frivolous. 
 
Only one of the foregoing cases, however , arose in the 
context of allegedly racially-motivated petitioning activity. 
Stevens involved a federal civil rights claimfiled by a school 
principal against members of the local parent-teacher 
association. See Stevens, 855 F.2d at 395. The plaintiff 
alleged that certain members of the association conspired 
to influence the board of education to transfer her to 
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another school because of her race.7 See id. But the court 
of appeals did not reach the immunity issue because it 
determined that the plaintiff had not suffered an injury at 
official hands. See id. at 405. The court remarked in dicta, 
however, that it "very much doubt[ed] that S 1985(3) 
properly may be used to penalize racially-motivated political 
campaigns, any more than the antitrust laws may be used 
to penalize deceitful campaigns to obtain pr otection from 
competition." Id. at 404. While we r ecognize that this 
statement certainly should have been an indication to the 
Barnes that its claims against the neighbors likely would 
not succeed, still inasmuch as it was made in a dif ferent 
circuit it does not carry such weight as to make the Barnes' 
claim legally frivolous. 
 
Moreover, we are encouraged to r each the conclusion that 
the Barnes' action was not legally frivolous by the 
circumstance that courts addressing that doctrine in a civil 
rights context have not adopted the Stevens position 
universally. In LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 
261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the district court denied the 
defendants' motion to dismiss in a situation in which they 
were accused of petitioning for the incorporation of a village 
to impose strict zoning rules which would discourage and 
prevent Orthodox Jewish residential neighborhoods from 
developing in the community. See id. at 267. The court 
stated: 
 
       Taking the plaintiffs' allegations of defendants' motives 
       as true, we are not prepared to conclude that 
       defendants' conduct is protected by the first 
       amendment. The `first amendment . . . may not be 
       used as the means or the pretext for achieving 
       "substantial evils" which the legislatur e has the power 
       to control.' . . . To allow individuals to avail themselves 
       of first amendment protections when it is alleged that 
       their conduct will lead to official misconduct in 
       violation of the United States Constitution would defeat 
       the purpose of the civil rights laws. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The plaintiff was white while the defendants, as well as the majority 
of the population of the plaintiff 's school, were African-American. See 
Stevens, 855 F.2d at 395. 
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Id. (quoting California Motor T ransp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515, 92 S.Ct. 609, 614 (1972)). In 
California Motor Transport, the Court held that the plaintiff, 
a trucking company, stated a cause of action under the 
Clayton Act against its competitors where the competitors 
engaged in concerted activities to institute state and federal 
proceedings designed to interfere with the plaintiff 's 
business. See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509, 92 
S.Ct. at 611. The Court relied on the "sham" exception to 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which denies immunity for 
petitioning activity where the purpose is solely to interfere 
with the business relationships of a competitor rather than 
to effectuate governmental action aimed at accomplishing 
the same result. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. at 533. 
 
Obviously LeBlanc-Sternberg was not binding authority in 
this circuit when the Barnes initiated this case but the 
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity as set forth 
in Noerr and California Motor T ransport certainly was. While 
there is a legitimate argument that the sham exception to 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine could not have been 
applicable here and that the Barnes should have so 
recognized, nevertheless LeBlanc-Ster nberg demonstrates 
that when the Barnes instituted this action there was some 
question as to the applicability of the Noerr -Pennington 
doctrine as a defense to its claim. 
 
Overall, we are satisfied that the availability of the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine as a defense to a federal civil rights 
claim where a defendant's conduct allegedly was racially 
motivated was not completely established in this court at 
the time the Barnes filed suit in this matter. Moreover, we 
are satisfied that notwithstanding the tr end of the cases at 
that time, other courts had not come to a unifor m 
conclusion on the point. Accordingly, taking into account 
the standards set forth in Christiansbur g and L.B. Foster, 
we conclude, though the issue is close, that the district 
court did not err in determining that the Bar nes' claim was 
not legally frivolous. 
 
Before we close our discussion of the Noerr -Pennington 
doctrine we hasten to add that persons contemplating 
bringing suits to stifle First Amendment activity should 
draw no comfort from this opinion because the uncertainty 
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of the availability of a First Amendment defense when a 
plaintiff brings a civil rights case now has been dispelled. 
This point is of particular importance in land-use cases in 
which a developer seeks to eliminate community opposition 
to its plans as this opinion should make it clear that it will 
do so at its own peril. 
 
D. Factual Sufficiency of Barnes' Claims 
 
Notwithstanding our conclusion with respect to the legal 
question of the applicability of the Noerr -Pennington 
doctrine, the factual sufficiency vel non of the Barnes' 
claims is quite another matter which we must consider 
separately. In considering this issue, we start by setting 
forth the elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1985(3), as Barnes sued the neighbors and thus the 
appellants under that statute. Section 1985(3) pr ovides a 
cause of action if: (1) two or more persons conspire to 
deprive any person of the equal protection of the law; (2) 
one or more of the conspirators perfor ms or causes to be 
performed any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
and (3) that overt act injures the plaintif f in his person or 
property or deprives the plaintiff of any right or privilege of 
a citizen of the United States. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403 U.S. 88, 102-03, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798-99 (1971); 
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F .2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 
1989). Section 1985(3), however, does not include a 
requirement that the conspirators act"under color of state 
law," as is the case in an action under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, as 
section 1985(3) makes actionable private conspiracies to 
deprive a citizen of the equal enjoyment of rights secured to 
all. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-102, 91 S.Ct. at 1794-98; 
Phillips v. Trello, 502 F.2d 1000, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Here, the Barnes predicated its claim of an equal protection 
violation on racial discrimination. While the Bar nes also 
brought its action against the appellants under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, we see no need to discuss the possible applicability 
of that section to the appellants who are private parties as 
our conclusion with respect to the Barnes' section 1985 
claim applies to its section 1983 claim as well. 
 
In analyzing the sufficiency of the factual basis for the 
Barnes' claims, the district court first r ecognized that the 
Barnes never proffered any dir ect evidence of racial 
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hostility. See Barnes Found., 1999 WL 1065213, at *3. The 
court found that instead the Barnes based the suit on 
conduct that, while subtle, could be consider ed no less 
discriminatory. See id. Therefor e, the court characterized 
the issue as follows: 
 
       Thus, in deciding the groundless issue, the key 
       questions are: Can this complaint be said to have a 
       factual foundation for its allegations of discriminatory 
       treatment based on race when those allegations are 
       based upon a theory that defendants' conduct, though 
       not found by direct evidence to be racially motivated, 
       was actually a sophisticated cover-up for racial 
       discrimination. That is, can a reasonable factual 
       foundation be established to support plaintif f 's theory 
       by drawing inferences from certain objective facts 
       which are generally not in dispute? 
 
Id. at *4. The district court answer ed its question 
affirmatively, though it qualified the answer by requiring 
that the inference be reasonable. See id. The court held 
that to base a complaint on circumstantial evidence, the 
"plaintiff must be able to point to a factual pattern which 
fairly implies racial discrimination, going beyond a mere 
suggestion that in today's world, subtle conduct masks 
racism." Id. The court found that the inferences supporting 
the Barnes' complaint were reasonable and thus it denied 
the appellants' motion for attorney's fees. 
 
In so holding, however, the district court completely 
ignored the opinions of the Supreme Court in Claiborne 
Hardware and of this court in Pfizer which held that the 
First Amendment requires more than evidence of 
association to impose liability for conspiracy and, in fact, 
prohibits liability on that basis alone. See Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 918-19, 102 S.Ct. at 3428-29; 
Pfizer, 46 F.3d at 1289. Thus, the Supr eme Court in 
Claiborne Hardware explained that "[f]or liability to be 
imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to 
establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and 
that the individual held a specific intent to further those 
illegal aims." Claiborne Hardwar e, 458 U.S. at 920, 102 
S.Ct. at 3429; see Pfizer, 46 F.3d at 1289. Furthermore, the 
court must judge this intent "according to the strictest law." 
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Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 919, 102 S.Ct. at 3429. 
Therefore, while it is clear that Claiborne Hardware and 
Pfizer were the controlling legal authorities when the 
district court denied the appellants' applications, and 
continue to be so, the district court did not follow or even 
cite either of those cases when it made its ruling. 
 
How, then, did the district court reach its r esult 
inasmuch as it acknowledged that there was no direct 
evidence of racial hostility on the appellants' part? See 
Barnes, 1999 WL 1065213, at *3. It did so by concluding 
that on the record before it, one r easonably could draw an 
inference of racial animus by the appellants sufficient to 
support a claim against all of them. Id. at *4. It based this 
conclusion on what it deemed a representative example of 
the Barnes' evidence of discriminatory tr eatment including: 
(1) an affidavit from Thomas Massaro, a land use 
consultant, who opined that the neighbors wer e so firmly 
and irrationally opposed to the Barnes' pr oposal that it 
suggested their concerns were a pr etext for racial prejudice; 
(2) Massaro's opinion that the neighbors' concerns about 
traffic problems caused by the Barnes were inconsistent 
with the realities of the neighborhood given the close 
proximity of St. Joseph's University and the Episcopal 
Academy; (3) an affidavit from Peter Kelsen, the attorney 
retained by the Barnes to secure a parking lot building 
permit, stating the Township should have allowed the 
parking lot without zoning board approval, Township 
representatives and neighbors expr essed a high level of 
animosity towards Glanton, their meetings wer e becoming 
increasingly confrontational and that comments by the 
neighbors were of an overly discriminatory nature; (4) an 
affidavit from Ann B. Laupheimer, an attorney for the 
Barnes, stating that she discussed the possibility of a 
lawsuit with other lawyers and, following an investigation 
into the law and facts, determined ther e was sufficient 
evidence to warrant proceeding; (5) an affidavit from 
Jordana Cooper, an attorney for the Barnes, acknowledging 
that while she did not anticipate the Noerr - 
Pennington defense, there was little r eason to do so because 
it was a novel one in this court at the time; (6) examples of 
unequal treatment by the Township with r egard to traffic 
and parking between the Barnes and its institutional 
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neighbors; (7) a Township Commissioner's alleged 
statement that the Commissioners were outraged and were 
going to help; and (8) Robert Marmon's statements at the 
November 15, 1995 meeting where he used "code words" 
such as "Mr. Glanton and his people,""carpetbaggers" and 
"outsiders" in discussing the situation at the Barnes. See 
id. at *2-3. This evidence, in addition to the historical 
background of the Barnes which involved overt racial 
hostility from the surrounding community, led the district 
court to conclude that it was reasonable to infer that each 
of the neighbors and thus each of the appellants was 
motivated by racial hostility. Id. at *4. 
 
We hold that the district court erred in its conclusion as 
obviously the items it cited were a totally inadequate 
foundation on which to predicate an infer ence that racial 
animus motivated the appellants, except possibly Robert 
Marmon. Indeed, it is not acceptable to pr edicate inferences 
of racial animus against the neighbors and thus the 
appellants because of the legal views of the Bar nes' 
professional representatives supporting its cause or 
because of the actions of Township officials. In particular, 
we point out that the Barnes' repr esentatives and the 
Barnes itself should have recognized that persons may 
controvert their views without being racists. 
 
Furthermore, with the exception of the last example 
considered by the district court, which mentions only 
Robert Marmon, none of the evidence that does refer to the 
Barnes' neighbors specifies which neighbors were involved 
in the actions. There are merely allegations that certain 
unnamed and unidentified "neighbors" wer e involved in 
allegedly discriminatory treatment. The same is true for the 
evidence the Barnes has highlighted on this appeal, see 
Barnes' Br. at 22-24, namely that: (1) the neighbors 
expressed concerns over increased traffic and parking 
problems associated with the use of the Bar nes' facility, but 
did not complain about the traffic generated by St. Joseph's 
University and the Episcopal Academy; (2) Robert Mar mon 
and Toby Marmon, Ina Asher and W alter Herman were seen 
in front of the Barnes among picketers holding signs 
reading "From LA to PA, Money Buys Justice" and "Lincoln 
University -- Go Home;" and (3) the neighbors founded, 
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were members of, and contributed money to the Latches 
Lane Neighborhood Association for the purpose of acting in 
concert against the Barnes.8 
 
There was, therefore, no evidence indicating racial 
animus on the part of five of the six defendants: Ina Asher, 
Steven Asher, Nancy Herman, Walter Herman or Toby 
Marmon. Nevertheless, in the absence of that evidence the 
district court relied on generalized assertions of 
discriminatory treatment to permit an inference to be 
drawn of racial animus on the part of all of the neighbors 
and thus of the appellants. This reliance plainly was 
contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Claiborne 
Hardware that in order to hold an individual liable by 
reason of association with a group ther e must be evidence, 
judged according "to the strictest law," that the individual 
held a specific intent to further those illegal aims. 
Accordingly, as to appellants Ina Asher , Steven Asher, 
Nancy Herman, Walter Herman and T oby Marmon, the 
district court erred in concluding that the Bar nes' 
complaint was not factually groundless and we thus will 
reverse the district court's order denying their motion for 
attorney's fees. 
 
In reaching our result, we feel constrained to point out 
that surely it is outrageous that the Bar nes, while 
purportedly securing its own civil rights, br ought a 
groundless action against the appellants ther eby trampling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are aware that the Bar nes alleged that appellant Steven Asher 
stated that we would prefer to live across the street from a "Kravco mall" 
than across the street from the Barnes. In this regard the Barnespoints 
out that Kravco owns or operates the King of Prussia mall which it 
asserts is "the largest mall in Pennsylvania." App. at 20-21. Obviously 
there was nothing racial in this statement as it merely demonstrated the 
strength of his opposition to the Barnes' reopening. We also point out 
that there is some question as to whether anyone, let alone any of the 
appellants, picketed with the signs that the Bar nes mentions. Indeed, 
the district court in its opinion granting summary judgment said "[t]he 
Barnes offers only a newspaper article published in the Philadelphia 
Inquirer reporting that such picketers and signs had been seen. The 
newspaper article is hearsay and cannot be consider ed on a motion for 
summary judgment." Barnes Found., 982 F. Supp. at 988 n.14. 
Nevertheless we will assume that the signs wer e present. 
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their First Amendment rights. To justify its conduct, the 
Barnes in the conclusion of its brief quotes our opinion in 
Aman v. Cost Furniture Rental Corp. , 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 
(3d Cir. 1996), to the effect that discrimination "continues 
to pollute the social and economic mainstream of American 
life" and that the courts should "ensur e that prohibited 
discrimination is not approved under the auspices of 
legitimate conduct." But in Aman we did not suggest that a 
minority-led organization was free tofile a baseless suit 
against persons challenging its activities and then be able 
to seek shelter behind its minority status when the 
wrongfully charged defendants seek r edress against it for 
having been put to the expense of defending against the 
action. In short, a minority-led organization is not 
exempted from facing the consequences of its wr ongful 
actions merely because of the race of its leadership. But the 
fact is that unless we discredit the deposition testimony of 
Charles A. Frank, III, which we discuss below, we must 
conclude that the Barnes cynically brought this frivolous 
action to capitalize on its minority status to achieve its goal 
of alleviating its parking problems. 
 
Notwithstanding our result with respect to the other five 
appellants, we are satisfied that the Bar nes did proffer 
evidence that racial animus may have motivated Robert 
Marmon's conduct. While his comments during the 
Commissioners' meeting were arguably racially ambiguous, 
we cannot say that it is unreasonable to infer that they 
communicated racial hostility and discriminatory 
motivation. Accordingly, although the evidence is thin, 
given the deferential standard of r eview on this appeal we 
cannot conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in determining that the Bar nes' claim against 
Robert Marmon was not factually groundless.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The appellants recognize that ther e was evidence that Robert Marmon 
acted for racial reasons, see br . at 33, though they deny that he did so. 
Of course, the absence of evidence to support a conclusion that the other 
appellants acted out of that motivation would not mean that the section 
1985 conspiracy claim against Robert Marmon therefore was necessarily 
groundless as there were other defendants in this action with whom he 
could have conspired. 
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The appellants also contend that the district court erred 
by failing to consider their evidence that Glanton and thus 
the Barnes had a wrongful ulterior motive in filing suit 
against them, namely to expedite the Township's approval 
for an on-site parking lot in part by stifling public 
opposition to its plans. The appellants argue that if left 
undisturbed, the district court's denial of their motion for 
attorney's fees will have a chilling ef fect on First 
Amendment activity by private individuals as they will face 
the possibility of being burdened with substantial legal 
expenses for engaging in constitutionally-pr otected 
conduct. In considering this argument we point out that the 
appellants' evidence of the Barnes' wr ongful motive in 
bringing this action obviously was compelling because they 
elicited the information from Franks at his deposition. After 
all, inasmuch as Franks was a Barnes trustee he would 
have been in a position to understand what the Bar nes was 
doing and the motivations for its actions. Franks testified 
that Glanton "has all along represented his interest in 
resolving the parking issues, and [Glanton] felt that the 
filing of [the] complaint [in this action] would accelerate the 
settlement of that issue. [Glanton] was only after his 
parking and nothing else." App. at 276. Further more, 
Franks stated his position that this action was of doubtful 
validity contemperaneously with the events as they 
unfolded for on January 18, 1996, the day the Bar nes filed 
this suit, he wrote Glanton and indicated that he was 
opposed to filing the complaint because he had"serious 
concerns whether the allegations in the draft complaint are 
appropriate or accurate." App. at 279. 
 
In denying the appellants' motion for attorney's fees, the 
district court did not mention their claim that the Barnes 
had brought this action in bad faith. The Bar nes seems to 
suggest that from this omission we should infer that the 
court considered and rejected the bad faith claim. See 
Barnes' Br. at 27-30. We, however, recently have held that 
"it is incumbent upon a district court to make its reasoning 
and application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so 
that we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to 
review for abuse of discretion." Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 
Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 196-97 (3d Cir . 2000). Without any 
statement from the district court explaining its reason for 
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not allowing the appellants attorney's fees on the basis of 
this claim, we are not able to say the district court rejected 
their argument. We recognize that a reversal on this bad 
faith point may have no practical consequences to the 
appellants other than Robert Marmon as they ar e entitled 
to reasonable attorney's fees for the r easons we already 
have set forth. Nevertheless, we will reverse on the bad 
faith claim and will remand the case to the district court for 
a determination of the appellants' claim that the Barnes 
brought this action in bad faith because Robert Marmon is 
entitled to receive the benefit of a r econsideration of his 




For the foregoing reasons we will r everse the order of the 
district court of November 24, 1999, and will r emand the 
case to that court for calculation of the attor ney's fees that 
should be allowed to the appellants other than Robert 
Marmon and to reconsider the claim that the Barnes 
brought this action in bad faith. In the event that the court 
determines that the Barnes brought this action in bad faith 
it shall allow him reasonable attorney's fees as well. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Although I agree with the Majority's holding that the 
Barnes Foundation's claims against the neighbors were not 
frivolous, I disagree that the Foundation's claims were 
factually groundless. I would affirm the District Court 
because its factual findings support its conclusion that the 
Foundation had a reasonable factual basis for bringing its 
S1985 claims. The decision made by the District Court was 
discretionary and mere disagreement with the lower court's 
decision is insufficient to overcome the substantial 
discretion the District Court has traditionally enjoyed. I fear 
the Majority elides our deferential postur e when reviewing 
for an abuse of discretion and crosses the line that limits 
our interference with a District Court's decision under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Accor dingly, I dissent. 
 
Before focusing on the District Court's factualfindings 
and why I find them sufficient to defeat the neighbors' 
argument that the Foundation's claims wer e not 
groundless, a review of our abuse of discr etion standard for 
reviewing attorney's fees is instructive. We have a long and 
well-established history of deferring to a District Court's 
award of attorney's fees. As we have often said, "the award 
of a reasonable attorney's fee is within the District Court's 
discretion." Silberman v. Bogle , 683 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 
1982); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976). 
Thus, as with any issue reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
our standard of review is narrow. See Silberman, 683 F.2d 
at 65. We will reverse only when the"judicial action is 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper 
standards, criteria, or procedures ar e used." Evans v. 
Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir . 1977). Stated 
differently, discretion is abused only where "no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Lindy, 540 F.2d at 115. If, however , reasonable persons 
could differ as to the propriety of the challenged action, 
then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its 
discretion. See id. 
 
Moreover, our task on review "is not to substitute the 
remedy [we] would have imposed had [we] been the district 
court; rather it is to determine whether the district court 
 
                                26 
  
observed the promulgated guidelines." Evans, 555 F.2d at 
379. An abuse of discretion does not exist simply because 
we disagree with the District Court's decision. See Lindy, 
540 F.2d at 116. 
 
We have vested the District Courts with discr etionary 
authority for good reason. The District Court has the 
distinct advantage of hearing and seeing evidence and 
testimony first-hand and has viewed the parties and the 
cause over a longer time period. As one commentator 
remarked, 
 
       [i]t is not that [the trial judge] knows more than his 
       loftier brothers; rather, he sees mor e and senses more. 
       In the dialogue between the appellate judges and the 
       trial judge, the former often seem to be saying: `You 
       were there. We do not think we would have done what 
       you did, but we were not present and we may be 
       unaware of significant matters, for the r ecord does not 
       adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial. 
       Therefore, we defer to you.' 
 
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, 
Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE  L. REV. 635, 663 (1971). 
Given the trial court's proximity to the issues, it is 
eminently appropriate that "[o]ne seeking to establish [ ] an 
abuse of discretion bears a heavy burden." Lindy, 540 F.2d 
at 116. 
 
I heartily agree with our esteemed colleague, Judge 
Aldisert, who, in an earlier fee case, said: 
 
       At bottom, this case is about whether an appellate 
       court appreciates the allocation of competence between 
       trial courts and reviewing courts. To be sure, 
       statements of deference by appellate courts to district 
       courts appear in this court's dispositions . . . . But 
       quoting a standard of review and r especting it are 
       different matters . . . . We must be vigilant of this 
       court's increasing proclivity to deny substituting its 
       judgment for that of the district court, but then to 
       proceed with the tack that it expressly r enounces. 
 
Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 
89 F.3d 1031, 1044 (3d Cir. 1996). Mor eover, I identify fully 
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with what he referred to as "a personal expression of what 
troubles me": 
 
       Appellate courts seem to have lost respect for the 
       narrow review encompassed in reviewing an exercise of 
       discretion. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       . . . Instead of playing a limited role in the 
       determination of attorney's fees in limited review of 
       discretion, the appellate courts, like the pr overbial 
       camel, have not only stuck their noses under the 
       district court's tent, but they are fully inside ranging 
       around in the turf that properly belongs to the district 
       courts. 
 
Id. at 1048. Judge Aldisert was dissenting from an opinion 
I had joined. But, I was as wrong then as I believe the 
majority is now. "Abuse" itself is a serious accusation and 
in using the term "abuse" to define our standard of review, 
our jurisprudence has recognized the institutional 
superiority of the District Court. Therefor e, we should not 
readily discard its findings and conclusions. 
 
A prevailing defendant seeking an award of attorney's 
fees carries an even heavier burden than a typical litigant 
trying to prove an abuse of discretion in another context. It 
is imperative that we use the utmost restraint in awarding 
attorney's fees to prevailing defendants, lest the award 
discourage novel or unpopular litigation, stifle attorneys' 
enthusiasm and creativity, and chill citizens' constitutional 
right to meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., Thomas 
v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(warning that overuse of Rule 11 sanctions may"chill 
attorney's enthusiasm and stifle the cr eativity of litigants in 
pursuing novel factual or legal theories"); Thomas D. Rowe, 
The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651, 661 (1982) (ar guing that fee 
shifting should not "deter good-faith pressing of tenable but 
not clear-cut claims and defenses, especially those turning 
on unresolved points of law or, in many instances, 
genuinely controverted factual disputes"); Eric Y. 
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible 
Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 429 
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n.180 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court "curbed the 
[Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awar ds] Act's impact on access 
[to the courts] by authorizing payment of fees to prevailing 
defendants where the plaintiff 's claim is `unreasonable' 
even though not made in bad faith"). Because of these 
concerns, awards of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants 
should be made sparingly and in only the most egr egious 
cases. In my view, the present case does not meet this 
stringent standard. 
 
In contrast to the Majority, I believe that the District 
Court's factual findings are sufficient to meet the legal 
threshold for allegations of racial animus on the part of the 
neighborhood association and the six neighbors (Ina Asher, 
Steven Asher, Nancy Herman, Walter Herman, Robert 
Marmon and Toby Marmon), all of whom are Caucasian. 
See Appellee's Br. at 4, 6. With r espect to the association, 
the District Court noted that during a Commissioner's 
meeting, Robert Marmon, one of the association's creators, 
coordinators, and spokespersons, made racially disparaging 
remarks about the Barnes Foundation. Specifically, Mr. 
Marmon repeatedly referred to the Foundation's members 
as "Mr. Glanton and his people," a paradigmatic reference 
to African-Americans, and then called them "carpetbaggers" 
and "outsiders." Given Mr. Marmon's leadership role, it was 
reasonable to believe that his racial animus r epresented the 
views of the association. Additionally, the neighbor hood 
association's lack of opposition to other institutions with 
parking and traffic needs similar to the Bar nes Foundation 
further evidences a racially discriminatory motive. 
 
Other facts in evidence also support the Foundation's 
allegations. For example, the District Court noted the 
affidavit of Thomas Massaro, a land use consultant, who 
opined that the neighbors were so irrationally and firmly 
opposed to the Foundation's proposal that it suggested 
their concerns were a pretext for racial prejudice. These 
attitudes could also suggest the same to the Foundation 
and the District Court. The Foundation also noted in its 
complaint that, along with other persons, appellants Ina 
Asher, Walter Herman, Robert Mar mon, and Toby Marmon 
congregated and picketed outside the Foundation during its 
opening gala event. Several of the picketers wer e observed 
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holding signs that read, "From LA to P A, Money Buys 
Justice" and "Lincoln University--Go Home." Mr. and Mrs. 
Marmon stood in the midst of traffic flow with their video 
cameras, shining the camera's lights into the cars pulling 
in for the opening event. Even if the defendants wer e not 
personally holding the racially derogatory signs, they 
protested alongside others who were. This provided the 
Foundation with a reasonable inference that the defendants 
sought to promote a message charged with racial overtones. 
Far from arbitrary or fanciful, these facts, which are 
undisputed, suggest the District Court had a r easonable 
basis for holding that the Foundation's allegations of racial 
animus were not factually groundless. 
 
I fear that the Majority affords too little attention to our 
long-standing principles governing the abuse of discretion 
standard and too easily discounts the findings of racial 
hostility. Today, racially motivated conduct is rarely blatant 
and easily discernible. Persons acting with racial animus 
have become more sophisticated in disguising their 
motivations. Although discrimination cases rar ely contain 
an evidentiary "smoking gun," this does not mean that 
racial animosity does not exist. As we earlier explained, 
 
       [a]nti-discrimination laws and lawsuits have`educated' 
       would-be violators such that extreme manifestations of 
       discrimination are thankfully rare. The sophisticated 
       would-be violator has made our job a little mor e 
       difficult. Courts today must be increasingly vigilant in 
       their efforts to ensure that prohibited discrimination is 
       not approved under the auspices of legitimate conduct, 
       and `a plaintiff 's ability to pr ove discrimination 
       indirectly, circumstantially, must not be crippled . . . 
       because of crabbed notions of relevance or excessive 
       mistrust of juries.' 
 
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp. , 85 F.3d 1074, 1081-82 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 
697 (7th Cir. 1987)). In light of this r eality, I believe the 
District Court's reliance on circumstantial evidence and its 
conclusion that the Barnes's claims had at least the 
threshold quantum of factual support was r easonable and 
well within its discretion. 
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Finally, I also disagree with the Majority's r eversal of the 
neighbors' bad faith claim. The Majority reverses the bad 
faith claim because the District Court made no mention of 
this argument. Thus, the Majority concluded that it "was 
not able to say that the district court rejected [it]." Maj. Op. 
at 25. In reversing the bad faith claim, the Majority cites 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F .3d 190, 196-97 
(3d Cir. 2000), wherein we stated that a District Court must 
explain its reasoning and application of the fee-awards 
jurisprudence to allow adequate review by an appellate 
court. However, we have also assumed that a District Court 
has considered or weighed an argument, even when it has 
failed to discuss the argument in its decision. See Acosta v. 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 717 F.2d 828, 844 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(assuming that the District Court weighed the amount of 
plaintiff 's recovery as a factor in a fee award even though 
the District Court did not state that it was doing so). 
Therefore, the District Court's failur e to discuss the bad 
faith claim does not necessarily imply that it overlooked or 
ignored it. 
 
In summation, jurisprudence has reposed in the District 
Court great discretionary power in fee cases. We must 
respect it. For these reasons, I str enuously dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
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